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Regulators have long been aware of the social aspects of communication, and have been
intimately involved with the various services - telecommunications, post, broadcasting etc.
- since their beginnings. Due to the widespread use of these services, there are many social
dimensions for regulators to cover. Initial ‘public interest’ arguments meant that virtually
all aspects could be regulated. For example, the 1927 Radio Act in the U.S. gave federal
regulators the power to issue a licence to a broadcaster if they found that it was in the
“public interest, convenience or necessity”. The absence of any clear definition of ‘public
interest’ means that the FCC - the U.S. regulator - could determine the number and
identity of broadcasters, the terms and conditions of their operation, and even their
broadcast content.
In this paper we address some broader social aspects of communication regulation, as
well as the competition issues that are raised by the adoption of particular policies. To
give an example, the interplay between regulation and competition can be seen in the
current ‘broadband debate’. Higher bandwidth services, such as high-speed Internet
service, video on demand and interactive electronic commerce, have been deemed by
many governments to be of fundamental importance to the development of their economy;
see e.g. Oftel (1999). A particular concern is the provision of these services to residential
customers, and also small businesses. This has highlighted the lack of competition in local
telecommunications markets. In the U.K., broadband services are likely, in the medium-
term, to be provided using enhancements (Digital Subscriber Line, DSL) to the fixed
copper loop telephone network; this sector is dominated by the incumbent British
Telecom, which supplies over 85% of access lines. In the U.S., local access is provided
both by cable and local telephone companies; the issue there is what carriage requirements
to impose on entrants to the local access market. Finally, the content that can be delivered
over high bandwidth access lines has lead to regulatory initiatives such as the European
Union’s Action Plan on Promoting Safer Use of the Internet, adopted on January 25th,
1999.
We will not attempt to cover all aspects of regulation in this paper. Instead, we will
focus on the interaction between the two objectives stated by most telecoms regulators.
For instance, the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the FCC to “promote
competition and preserve and advance universal service”.3
2. Definition and evidence
There are several reasons given for imposing universal service obligations (USOs). First,
it is often thought that utilities such as electricity, water and telecommunications services
are necessities that should be readily available to all, simply on the grounds of equity. This
argument can be supplemented with the idea that complete access to essential services
stimulates economic development and growth. Thirdly, there may be significant positive
externalities associated with a service (such as a communication network) that the market,
left unregulated, would fail to incorporate, leading to insufficient coverage of the network.
A USO may be required to correct for this market failure. For these and other arguments,
see Cremer et al. (1998).1
Even if the general principles behind USOs are agreed upon, there still is the problem
of putting them into practice. There are three aspects to this. First, what exactly should be
provided and to whom? Secondly, who should be required to fulfil a USO? Thirdly, who
should pay for the costs of a USO? 
The exact definition of universal service is not clear. The most commonly used notion
refers to achieving a “minimum quality level” of a “basic package” of services to all
consumers and at “affordable prices”. In the case of telecommunications, this sort of
statement can be found in Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and European
Commission (EC) communications; see the FCC’s CC Docket 96-45 and the EC
communication COM(96) 73. Each part of this statement is open to interpretation - what is
a minimum quality level, what constitutes a basic package, what prices are affordable?
Hence the FCC has listed a set of services and quality levels that are included in universal
service (e.g., voice-grade access to the public switched network, touch-tone, etc.), and
detailed maximum prices that can be charged for specific services, and on average across
all services. This exercise is, of course, problematic. Technological progress means that
the set of basic services is constantly expanding, and minimum quality levels are
ambiguous (for example, wireless services allow greater mobility, but typically have lower
sound quality and completion rates).
                                                
1 See also Laffont and Tirole (2000, chapter 6), Mason and Valletti (2001), and Riordan (2001) for further
discussions of universal service in telecommunications. 4
In the past, incumbent telecom operators were responsible for USOs; indeed, in the
U.K., this is still the case.2 In the U.S., USOs are not restricted to incumbents, and
universal service subsidies are paid to any company that accepts a commitment to service
all consumers in its area. The subsidies are paid for typically by cross-subsidization: the
income from more profitable markets (such as long-distance or business customers) is
used to cover losses incurred by charging low prices to low-income or high-cost
consumers. The alternative of financing universal service subsidies through general
taxation is not generally used in telecommunications, although it is used in other markets;
for example, in the U.K., subsidies to winners of railroad franchises are covered from
general taxes. This is despite the fact that financing from general taxation could be a
cheaper (i.e., less distortionary) way to raise the required revenue.
USOs are under increasing pressure. The first source of pressure appears to be
political, but actually has solid economics to back it up. A major problem with USOs is
that they are blunt. A USO to cover high-cost rural areas at the same price as low-cost
urban areas benefits high-income rural consumers at the expense of low-income urban
consumers. More precisely, it may be inefficient to further a particular objective - higher
welfare for rural residents - through distorting the prices of particular services. This point
has been made formally by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), who show that, under certain
circumstances, the best way to redistribute income is through the taxation of income, not
consumption. In their model, consumers differ in their income levels (actually, in their
ability levels, which affect income). Hence their result speaks most directly to the issue of
subsidies to low-income consumers. It is straightforward, however, to re-interpret their
model in terms of low- and high-cost consumers. One of the key conditions required for
this result is that low- and high-income consumers have the same relative preferences for
consumption goods (i.e., the marginal rate of substitution between consumption goods is
independent of income). In this case, taxing consumption - effectively what occurs when
the prices of telecommunications services are altered - in order to fund universal service is
unnecessarily inefficient. A better way to redistribute income (which, after all, is what a
                                                
2 In the U.K., British Telecom is restricted to charging geographically uniform prices to ensure that high-
cost (e.g., rural) areas are serviced. The regulator - Oftel - first decided that USO costs be funded by all
operators, on the basis of indicators like revenue shares. However, the limited size of the burden
subsequently convinced the regulator in 1997 that there was no need to establish a fund because USOs gave
BT some benefits that outweighed the direct costs (benefits included rather cloudy concepts such as brand
enhancement, ubiquity and "life-cycle" effects, where an uneconomic customer can become a more5
universal service subsidy does) is to tax income. To encourage people to live in high-cost
rural areas, the theorem suggests that a location-specific income tax break is better than
offering a telecommunications subsidy.
Changes in the assumptions underlying the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem will, evidently,
change the result. For example, it may be that the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption goods is not independent of income. Then it may be worth taxing those
goods that the rich have a relative preference for and subsidizing the goods preferred
(relatively) by the poor. Nevertheless, the result is important for emphasizing that USOs
must be assessed carefully for their validity and not simply accepted.3
Abstracting now from theoretical motivations that may justify the imposition of
USOs, how have they fared in practice? To answer this question, one needs to understand
first why telephone penetration may be different in different areas. After surveying the
existing empirical literature on the topic, Riordan (2001) summarises that the major
predictor of residential telephone penetration is poverty. In particular, an income
redistribution that would lower the poverty rate of an area by 10%, while holding the
median income constant, would add 2.5% percentage points to telephone penetration in
the U.S.. Published research generally finds that the price elasticity of residential demand
is very low - of the order of -0.02. This is a bit worrying since the lack of responsiveness
of demand could undermine both targeted and untargeted public programs that subsidise
penetration. However, the price elasticity for low income people is significantly higher,
giving some support for universal service policies that target low income households.
There is also some (weaker) evidence that network externalities matter, justifying policies
that may expand the reach of service beyond the level that would be chosen individually
by people and to overcome a co-ordination problem when too few people connect if it is
expected that too few people connect. Also, race seems an important predictor in the U.S..
Asian populations are more likely, and black and Hispanic populations less likely than
white households to have telephones.4
                                                                                                                                                  
profitable BT customer in the future). In any case, the idea of a fund has not been dismissed and may
become relevant in the future.
3 The idea that it is more efficient to finance USOs from general taxation has to be assessed against the
efficiency of the taxation system of the country under consideration. This may make the "old" system of
financing that relies on cross subsidies still an attractive solution in developing countries, if the social cost of
public funds is high or if there is some leakage of tax revenues due, for instance, to corruption. See Gasmi et
al. (2000).
4 See also Taylor (1994).6
It may be argued that network externalities should not be central anymore to the
debate on universal service for many "mature" services in developed countries, given that
the level of penetration reached is already high. In addition, operators themselves may use
pricing strategies to co-ordinate consumers, thus internalising the network externality.
These views are not immune to criticism. For instance, even if the marginal consumer
confers a small externality, this has to be multiplied by a large number. For example,
suppose that each individual gains a benefit of 1 from being able to communicate with any
other individual; and suppose that there are N individuals on the network. Then the total
value of the network is the number of pairings N(N - 1), which is close to N
2 when N is
large. This square relationship between the number of members of a network and the value
of the network is known as Metcalfe’s law, and it still does provide a theoretical argument
for universal service programs. However, it is clear that there are also limits to this kind of
justification for subsidies. In particular, subsidies should be at the margin and it is not
necessary to subsidise the majority of infra-marginal customers that would be on the
network without any inducement. It is perhaps fair to say that there is now a consensus
that targeted programs fare better than uniform subsidies and that the latter are unlikely to
improve average consumer welfare. There also seems to be room for the introduction of
more optional tariffs for local services. A "menu" of contracts, designed having in mind
the needs of the poor and of the low-volume users, could be designed at a low cost in
order to induce more people to subscribe without having to subsidise the large majority of
the population.
The FCC has recently established a programme of subsidies for the highest cost
wirecenters in the highest cost states in the U.S.. The estimates obtained by the FCC for
the average cost of local telephone services are used to calculate a “benchmark” that
determines the eligibility of operators to receive universal service funds (subsidies are
"portable", i.e. they are paid to whichever firm provides the service). The intention of the
recent legislation is to move from implicit to explicit subsidies, while promoting the
affordability of telephone service and access to the network. These are laudable goals but
one should check the data to see whether the intentions are implemented in practice by
federal and state programs. Rosston and Wimmer (2000) assess the costs and benefits of
universal service programs at the state level, assuming that states provide subsidies to
those areas with costs higher than the benchmark (net of federal subsidies). In order to
evaluate the impact of different policies, it is important to have information about7
customers’ responses to price changes, something that is completely ignored by
regulations purely based on costs.
Since – as we wrote before – demand for access is typically inelastic (some people
may actually be driven off the network by usage-related charges rather than access
charges), they find that the current system in the U.S. has the unfortunate effect of
requiring huge amounts of money while producing small effects on subscription rates.
There are important differences among states, but the results of Rosston and Wimmer
challenge the myth of affordability in a developed country by showing that the elimination
of subsidies would only have a mild impact on the size of the network. If the current
programs fail with respect to subscribership, their magnitude could still be justified by
horizontal equity considerations. Rosston and Wimmer show how they fail in this respect
too: winners may be rich households living in rural areas while losers in urban areas
include a disproportionate percentage of poor, black and Hispanic households. Also in this
case, targeted programs are cheaper and perform better than cost-based rules that pay a
subsidy to all consumers in an area, whether they need the subsidy or not. However,
targeted programs themselves may still be wasteful. Some authors believe there is no need
to continue either type of subsidy, since the impact on telephone penetration is negligible.5
The main reason for keeping such programs in place – they would argue – is then to
redistribute income and/or to use them for political reasons given the rents at stake.
3. Universal Service in the European Union
The current EU regulatory framework requires national regulatory authorities (NRAs) to
impose obligations to ensure that a defined minimum set of services of specified quality
are available to all, regardless of their geographical location, and at an affordable price,
where affordability must be seen in the context of the national situation. There are also
obligations to provide payphones to cover reasonable needs, and directory services. In
addition, there are provisions for specific measures for disabled users and users with
special needs. A Member State may impose these obligations on one or more operators.
                                                
5 There are some studies on the impact that some specific programs (Lifeline and LinkUp) have had in the
U.S. in recent years. Such programs reduce the monthly cost of the telephone service of low-income
households and subsidise the installation of a new subscription for eligible households. The evidence is
mildly in favour of them as an effective way of promoting universal service. See Garbacz and Thompson
(2001) and Riordan (2001) for a discussion.8
Despite the natural rhetoric in claiming that the objective is to give EU citizens a
world-class communications infrastructure, delivering the best deal in terms of prices,
quality, etc., the EU has left the actual implementation of its recommendations to Member
States. Originally, the Commission tried a more proactive role, suggesting the creation of
some specific funds, one per Member State, that would control the use of EU structural
funds for regional development projects. These projects could be targeted at those
countries that were greatly in need of basic infrastructure. While these plans are indeed
still a possibility, they have not been adopted for Universal Service provision, highlighting
the lack of authority on the EU telecommunications industry. Hence the details of USOs
are entirely left to NRAs. On the other hand, the EU does regulate how a Member State
may design a US fund. Only simple public switched telephony services, which include
voice, fax, and data transmission, may be funded. Providers of Internet services, value-
added services and private networks are exempted from contributing to USOs. Finally,
there are two funding options. The first is to levy supplementary charges on top of regular
interconnection charges, and the second is to create a US fund. The Commission has
clearly stated that it prefers the latter option, whereby the US cost is paid either out of the
State budget, by eligible market participants, or by end users though a tax.
We cannot review here all the single national experiences. However, it is important to
stress three points: a) historically, USOs have been intertwined with the liberalisation
process occurring within a given country, b) the stance that a given country decided to
take with respect to USOs reflected the general national philosophy towards the
importance of competition in the telecommunications industry, c) where USO costs have
been calculated (but not necessarily funded), the best practice consisted in the calculation
of net avoidable costs based on LRIC, which is good accounting practice but does not
necessarily reflect economic principles. In practice, this has led most countries not to
implement any funding because the US costs were deemed to be too small. As we argue
below, different reasons were behind this outcome.
To give a few examples, quite a lot of confusion arose in the early days on the
linkages between access deficit contributions (ADCs) and USOs. This was due to different
stages in the price rebalancing process accompanying liberalisation. For instance, we have
already mentioned that the UK decided that the costs incurred by BT for USOs did not
justify any payment. That was due to the small figures involved (gross costs of around £
50-70m in 1999, less than 0.3% of telecommunications turnover). Price rebalancing in the9
UK started back in 1984 with the privatisation of BT, hence when the discussion on USOs
became central in the late 90’s, line rental rates had already been increased close to their
relative costs. Since BT also received direct revenues from US, on top of some indirect
benefits, the regulator decided that USOs did not represent an unjust burden and did not
require any funding (the NRA will review this decision in 2003). Finland, which has a
very well developed telecommunications infrastructure, does not even have an explicit
definition of USO in its legislation.
On the other hand, in France the regulator calculated figures much higher than in the
UK (FF 5,000-6,000m in 1997 and 1998 – around 4% of telecommunications turnover)
that did include the lack of rebalancing (hence the loss made on access by France
Telecom), requiring other operators to pay a surcharge in their interconnection charge.
Only in 2000 France introduced a new mechanism entirely based on a US fund, where all
the operators must contribute according to their volumes of traffic. The French case
reflects a preference for a sort of protection of the incumbent operator that, according to
their view, would ensure that the country would receive essential services. On the other
hand, entrants have to bear some of the costs, making USOs a potential barrier to entry.
Italy started with a tariff structure much closer to France than to the UK. Telecom
Italia calculated big access deficits (decreasing from lira 5,500 billion in 1997, to 4,100 in
1998, 3,300 in 1999) on top of USOs (lira 650 billion in 1999, 390 in 2000). However, the
NRA systematically challenged the figures put forth by the incumbent, cutting them down
to considerably lower levels (USOs: lira 120 billion in 1999, 114 in 2000), which then had
to be funded by fixed and mobile operators, proportionally to their revenues. The Italian
regulator is now considering the introduction of “pay-or-play” mechanisms where USOs
may be fulfilled by various operators.
In Germany no operator a priori has US obligations, but they can be imposed in
specific markets if it is acknowledged that they are underprovided, or if the incumbent
operator DT decides to change its terms or range of providing universal service. In this
case, DT is obliged to give one year’s advance notice, so that the regulator has enough
time to intervene.
3.1 Accession countries
A particular area of concern is universal service in telecommunications for the 13
countries that are in the process of negotiating accession to the EU. Most accession10
countries have implemented US policies because of their commitment to transpose the
acquis communautaire. This may be worrying because it is not clear if universal service
policies that are valid in EU (rich) countries with fully developed networks should be
replicated on a similar scale in (middle and lower-middle income) accession countries.
According to a recent study commissioned by the EC (WIK, 2001), these policies would
be too costly given the other pressing needs for tax revenues such as for healthcare,
education or pensions. 
The WIK study recommends to focus instead on addressing USO problems with
market based solutions, with modest schemes being added incrementally onto market
outcomes. For instance, they recommend targeted schemes, tariff rebalancing and de-
averaging of tariffs. The latter, in particular, can help overcome the reluctance of operators
to build networks and add subscribers in high cost rural areas. Another problem of
accession countries is that they may even not have the appropriate institutional
endowment to handle the level of detail and intervention that is required to administer
USO programmes. EU law should then not require these countries to adopt measures that
are beyond their present economic means.
4. USOs and competition
A major challenge facing USOs comes from the introduction of competition.
Telecommunications markets in many countries have been opened up to competition. In
the U.S., the break-up of AT&T in 1984 allowed competition in previously monopolized
markets. In the U.K., the first competitor to the previously-nationalized BT was licensed
in 1982; in 1991, the market was opened further and several new operators were licensed.
In both cases, the idea was to use competitive forces to assist in the regulation of dominant
operators. But this has consequences for the financing of USOs. USOs are supported by
cross-subsidization. This cross-subsidization is sustainable while a single firm operates
across the various markets, as was the case in the U.S. and the U.K. until the early 1980s.
But when a second firm is able to operate, it will choose to enter the more profitable
markets (precisely the ones that generate the cross-subsidy) - a process known as cream
skimming. This has three implications that we address in turn. First, the distortions in
prices that the USO requires can lead to inefficient entry. Secondly, the subsidy required
to support the USO is higher than what it would be if entry could not occur. Since
financing the USO is distortionary, this means that the social cost of the USO is higher.11
Finally, USOs that come in the form of a uniform pricing requirement have strategic
effects that need to be recognised by regulators. Notable examples of such strategic effects
are coverage decisions and auctions for minimum subsidies required to supply a high-cost
region.
4.1 Entry
The point on the possibility of inefficient entry is most clearly seen in a single market
case. (The following example is taken from Armstrong 2001.) Suppose that there is a
single group of consumers with inelastic unit demand for telecommunications service. The
incumbent can provide this service at cost C per consumer, giving each consumer gross
utility U. The price that the incumbent charges is mandated to be P per consumer; if the
consumers belong to a high-cost market, then typically P < C. An entrant can provide the
same service at cost c, giving gross utility of u; it charges a price p, where p is not
restricted (since the USO is imposed only on the incumbent).
Social welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and firms’ profits; so welfare when the
incumbent serves the market is (U – P) + (P – C) = U – C, and when the entrant serves the
market, it is u – c. Hence entry is socially desirable if and only if u – c ≥ U – C i.e., C ≥ c
+ U – u. Given the incumbent’s price, the entrant can attract consumers if its price
satisfies u – p ≥ U – P; that is, if P – U + u ≥ p. Entry will occur whenever the maximum
price that the entrant can charge covers its cost, that is when P – U + u ≥ c, or P ≥ c + U –
u. Comparing this with the socially optimal condition for entry, we see that whenever P
does not equal C (which is typically the case when USOs are involved), entry occurs
inefficiently. When P > c + U – u > C, entry occurs when it is socially undesirable. When
P < c + U – u < C, entry does not occur, even though it is socially desirable.
A well-designed universal service fund could be instrumental in order to align the
private with the social incentives. To see this, imagine an output tax t = P – C has to be
paid into an industry fund when supplying the areas in question. Then the entrant would
indeed enter only when it is socially efficient. Notice that the tax corresponds to the
opportunity cost of the incumbent when it loses a customer after entry has occurred. In
practice, operators should pay into the fund when they enter a profitable market (P > C)
and receive a subsidy from the fund when they serve otherwise loss-making areas. This
argument can be extended to incorporate access pricing. Armstrong (2001) shows that a
variant of the Efficient Component Pricing Rule would be efficient, charging access at12
cost so long as an output tax calculated along the lines shown above is also in place. The
general moral that emerges is that when there are retail distortions due to a USO, a retail
instrument should be used in combination with an appropriate access charge. Use of the
access charge alone both to provide the right entry incentives and to correct the retail
distortion is inferior.
4.2 Subsidies
We now turn to the second type of interaction that USOs and competition might produce.
When consumers are heterogeneous, with some being high-cost and others low-cost, a
USO subsidy set without regard to competition will be “too” low. Imagine, for the sake of
the argument, that there are x customers in an urban area, with unit cost equal to 1, and (1
– x) customers in a rural area where it costs 2 to supply each one of them. Also imagine
that at first there is only one regulated monopoly firm and that the regulator chooses a
"bracketed" uniform price 1 < p < 2 for all the customers, due to the typical requirement of
average geographic price uniformity. In order not to make losses, the monopolist supplier
will have to be paid a subsidy per customer equal to the difference between the average
cost and the uniform price, i.e. s = (2 – x) – p.
Consider now what happens if there is potential entry. The previous situation would
not be sustainable due to cream skimming. If the potential entrant is an operator not
subject to universal service requirements (and not eligible to any subsidy), it could target
the customers in the urban area only. Also imagine now the incumbent is not subject
anymore to a geographic averaging requirement (more on this below), however it still has
to charge at most the previous price p to all customers. Potential competition then brings
the price in the urban area down to its cost, i.e. 1. In equilibrium, urban customers would
still be supplied by the incumbent since it would still get a subsidy s' per customer while
the entrant is not eligible. It is then immediate to calculate the subsidy that is now needed
for the incumbent to break even: s' = (2 – p)(1 – x). The result is that the new subsidy per
customer has to be higher than before: s' – s = x(p – 1) > 0. The reason is simple. The
"old" subsidy assumes that the operator can earn excess profits from low-cost consumers
that can be used to finance service to high-cost consumers. Competition eliminates these
profits, and so increases the required subsidy (see Laffont and Tirole, 2000, for further
elaboration on this).13
4.3.1 Multimarket oligopolies and coverage
The third interesting implication arises precisely from the geographic averaging
requirement that the regulator often still imposes even in a competitive environment and
that we neglected above. The effects from these obligations have been studies by Anton et
al. (2001), Choné et al. (2000) and Valletti et al. (2002). These authors show that a USO
affects the way in which operators compete. In particular, a uniform pricing restriction
creates linkages between markets, along the lines identified in Bulow et al. (1985). This
makes operators less aggressive in those markets, leading to higher equilibrium prices and
deadweight loss.
Following Valletti et al. (2002), we assume that there is a continuous set [0, x
max] of a
priori independent markets, ordered by the fixed cost of serving them – from the cheapest
to the most expensive – but identical in terms of the population served. In a first step we
assume that an incumbent firm and an entrant have decided to cover the areas [0, x1] and
[0, x2], respectively, with x2 < x1. For simplicity we assume zero marginal cost and that
firms compete in quantity competition with linear demand functions P = 1 – Q, similar to
Anton et al. (2001), while Choné et al. (2000) and Valletti et al. (2002) treat the arguably
more realistic case of price competition. Under positive marginal cost, or price
competition with sufficiently differentiated goods, the results are qualitatively the same. If
no uniform pricing constraint is imposed, and in the absence of other price regulation,6 it
is clear that the equilibrium in each market is determined independently, with P
C = 1/3, the
Cournot equilibrium price, in the duopoly area [0, x2], and P
M = 1/2, the monopoly price,
in the monopoly region [x2, x1].
A uniform pricing constraint imposed on the incumbent makes this kind of
discriminatory pricing impossible, but more importantly creates two opposing incentives
in all markets which link them strategically: The incumbent would wish to set a high price
to cash in on his captive consumers, while competing effectively in the duopoly area. This
leaves the incumbent at a strategic disadvantage in the duopoly markets, benefiting the
entrant.
With quantity competition, a uniform pricing constraint can be interpreted as the
constraint to not charge a higher price in the monopoly markets than in the duopoly14
markets, which is equivalent to requiring that in these markets the incumbent sells a
quantity equal to the sum of quantities in the duopoly markets. Incumbent and entrant
solve:
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While the entrant’s best response q2 = 1/2 – q1/2 is the usual Cournot best response,
the incumbent’s best response is q1 = 1/2 – (1 – x2/2x1)q2. It depends on relative coverage
k = x2/x1, and therefore also the ensuing equilibrium will do so. The result is price
bracketing, with the equilibrium price P




M. For k = 0 we obtain P
UP = P
M, and for k = 1, P
UP = P
C. A lower
relative coverage k turns the incumbent’s reaction function downwards, and leads to lower
equilibrium total quantity Q = (1 + k)/(2 + k) and a higher equilibrium price P
UP. This
means that the lower prices created by competition that were supposed to be distributed
everywhere through the uniform pricing constraint may hardly materialise if the relative
coverage of the entrant remains small.
This effect is compounded if the incumbent is required to cover the whole country [0,
x
max], and the entrant can freely choose its coverage. Valletti et al. (2002) show that the
larger the mandated coverage of the incumbent, the larger the equilibrium coverage of the
entrant will be, but this increase in coverage is less than proportional: relative coverage
decreases. This means that through the strategic effect prices will rise as mandated
coverage is increased even though the competitive position of the entrant is effectively
strengthened. As a result, the entrant and newly served customers are the ones who gain
from a higher mandated coverage, while previous customers may lose out. The welfare of
the latter decreases because they face higher prices, unless strong network effects
compensate for the price increase.
If firms compete in prices instead of quantities some additional effects may arise if the
services offered are close substitutes: Valletti et al. (2002) have shown that in this case the
incumbent has a strong incentive to lower the intensity of competition with the entrant.
One instrument to achieve this is (strategic) quality degradation, where the incumbent
                                                                                                                                                  
6 Qualitatively similar results are obtained in the presence of a price cap.15
deliberately offers lower quality to some customers. If these consumers are then more
likely to buy from the entrant, in this way competition is effectively restricted to a smaller
set of customers, while the incumbent on the surface still offers his services to all of them.
For close substitutes the resulting rise in the equilibrium uniform price more than
compensates for the loss in customers, and leads to higher profits for both firms, while
consumer welfare decreases.
4.3.2 Multimarket oligopolies and auctions for subsidies
The tension between universal service and competition represents a considerable challenge
for regulators. A promising line of research to resolve this tension is the use of universal
service auctions, in which operators bid for a level of subsidy (competition for the
market), with the market structure after the auction determined by the bids in the auction
(competition in the market).
Anton et al. (2001) have analysed this question in a framework of two markets. Let us
call [0, x 2] the (profitable) urban market, and (x2, x
max] the (loss-making) rural market
(now k = x2/x
max). They ask the question: Starting from two firms serving only the urban
market, how high will the subsidy be that is necessary to auction off the obligation to
serve the rural market, in the presence of a uniform pricing constraint? In this initial
situation, firms play the Cournot equilibrium, with equilibrium price P
C = 1/3 and profits
πc = x2/9 (gross of fixed cost). From a non-strategic point of view, the subsidy should be
equal to the losses generated by serving the rural market, subject to the restrictions
imposed on pricing in this market, i.e. s = F – πr > 0, where πr are rural profits, and F is
the fixed cost of serving the rural market, assumed to be larger than even the monopoly
profits.
The strategic effect discussed above weakens the competitive position in the urban
market of the firm serving both markets, resulting in lower urban profits for this firm, and
higher profits for the other firm. Therefore the firm that takes on the universal service
obligation must not only be reimbursed for the costs of serving the rural market, but also
for the lower profits it will make in the urban market. Furthermore, the auction must solve
the “free rider” problem caused by the increase in profits of the firm that continues to
serve only the urban market: Each firm would like the other one to win the auction unless
the subsidy is high enough. If the ex post urban profits under uniform pricing are πu =
x2/(2 + k)
2 > πc, and the profits of the firm serving both markets are πur = x1/(2 + k)
2 – F <16
πc, the subsidy must be such that both firms are indifferent between winning the auction or
not, s’ = πu – πur, which leaves them with profits πu > πc. The need to take into account the
strategic effect of serving both markets under a uniform pricing constraint may thus raise
the subsidy substantially, and even leaves both firms with higher profits than if they were
just serving the urban market.
The mere process of the determination of the value of subsidies can have important
strategic implications if a uniform pricing constraint is imposed. Returning to the model
from above, assume that the incumbent firm has mandated coverage [0, x
max] and makes
losses in the markets with the highest fixed cost. If the subsidy required to cover these
losses is calculated with respect to the price level and coverage without subsidy, and paid
as a lump-sum, there are no strategic effects. If on the other hand the regulator or
government incur a commitment to cover any losses that are made in the high-cost
markets, without fixing the amount ex ante, the result is that the incumbent will be a more
aggressive competitor. In the extreme case where the subsidy completely covers all losses
in the high-cost markets, these markets disappear from the incumbent’s objective function,
and in terms of payoffs he is in the same situation as if he could freely choose his
coverage. Valletti et al. (2002) have shown that when both entrant and incumbent can
choose coverage, the entrant’s equilibrium coverage and prices are lower. This means that
the incumbent makes losses in many more markets than previously, and therefore the
benefit of lower prices is contrasted with a possibly substantially higher subsidy and a
smaller coverage by the entrant. The difference of this result from Anton et al.’s is that
here the subsidy itself has strategic effects because it effectively liberates the incumbent
from the mandated coverage constraint and its strategic implications.
5. Conclusions
We conclude by summarizing the most important problems related to Universal Service
Obligations:
•  Universal Service Obligations are justified on efficiency grounds while it is debatable
if they are also called for on equity grounds, since there may be better tools to achieve
redistribution.
•  On the efficiency side, there is a sound theoretical argument for universal service
programs. They can reduce the risk that customers may not subscribe to a network17
since they do not take into account the benefit they confer on existing users. Even if
the marginal consumer confers a small externality, this has to be multiplied by large
numbers.
•  However, it has to be clear that there are also limits to this kind of justification for
subsidies. In particular, subsidies should be at the margin and it is not necessary to
subsidize the majority of infra-marginal customers that would be on the network
without any inducement. In this respect, targeted programs fare much better than
uniform subsidies. There also seems to be room for the introduction of more optional
tariffs for local services. A "menu" of contracts, designed having in mind the need of
the poor and the low users, could be designed at a low cost in order to induce more
people to subscribe without having to subsidize the large majority of the population.
•  There is no reason to subsidize or maintain artificially distorted tariff structures in the
belief that this is the only way to increase the subscriber base. As said above,
affordability should be interpreted as affordability among an incremental group of
users who are considering taking up or dropping the service.
•  Regulators should play carefully with USOs since they tend to be used by market
players to extract too many concessions.
•  Recent research has also shown that USOs have important strategic implications and
affect the way firms compete against each other.
•  Countries should distinguish clearly between universal availability and universal
service guarantees. The former is promoted by encouraging investments and removing
entry barriers. Only the latter should be explicitly linked to possible costing and
financing requirements.
•  The approach should be technologically neutral, enabling wireline and wireless
technologies to be used to provide services. It is important to maintain incentives for
competing networks and/or technologies to provide (part of) the universal service
provisions.
•  There are benefits from using auctions to assign USOs since the regulator does not
need to calculate net costing. There are also problems. It may be difficult to have
sufficient participants bidding against the incumbent (in many cases entrants would
need to use alternative infrastructure or acquire the use of the incumbent's assets).
Another reason is the asymmetry of information between the incumbents and new18
entrants, for example concerning the costs and benefits of serving groups of
customers.
•  If an auction is not feasible due to the reasons described above, then the regulator must
calculate the net cost and then proceed to financing requirements.
•  Financing these costs imposes distortions and regulators should try to minimize losses
of allocative efficiency. The least distortionary way to finance net costs is probably
from the government central budgets. Alternatively, funding should be recovered
within the sector, raising a tax from the broadest possible base, in order to minimize
the impact of the financial burden falling on end-users. The answer to this depends to a
great extent on the efficiency of the tax system.
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